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What causes 
accidents?
This paper describes aspects of the findings of a three-year 
research project, Construction Accident Causality, funded by 
the UK Health and Safety Executive. The project developed 
a causality model, through a combination of focus groups 
and detailed study of 100 construction accidents, using an 
ergonomics systems approach, to identify where safety 
is compromised and why. It concludes that stakeholders 
responsible for the immediate accident circumstances, shaping 
factors and originating influences must all work hard to remove 
flaws in their safety systems to ensure that accidents are reduced.
This paper describes aspects of the findings 
of a three-year research project, Construction 
Accident Causality (ConCA),1 funded by 
the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE). 
ConCA used a combination of focus groups 
and a detailed study of 100 construction acci-
dents using an ergonomics systems approach, 
to identify where safety is compromised and 
why. Other aspects of this major study have 
been published elsewhere.1-3
Although the British construction industry 
is one of the safest in Europe, one third of 
all work fatalities occur in construction and 
construction workers are six times more likely 
to be killed at work than employees in other 
sectors. A similar situation exists for non-fatal 
accidents. Although previous research has led 
to a good understanding of the extent and pat-
tern of accidents in the construction industry, 
there has been only limited objective analysis 
of the full range of contributory managerial, 
site and individual factors. With this back-
ground, ConCA had the following aims.
■ To collect rich, detailed data on the full 
range of factors involved in a large sample 
of construction accidents.
■ Using this information, to describe the 
processes of accident causation, including 
the contribution of management, project, 
site and individual factors in construction 
industry accidents.
Drawing together the findings, ConCA pro-
posed an accident model, illustrating the hier-
archy of influences in construction accidents 
(Fig. 1). The model describes how accidents 
arise from a failure in the interaction between 
the work team, workplace, equipment and 
materials. 
These immediate accident circumstances, 
which relate to the site of the accident or inci-
dent, are affected by shaping factors, whereby 
the actions, behaviour, capabilities and com-
munication of the work team are affected by 
their attitudes, motivations, knowledge, skills, 
supervision, health and fatigue. The workplace 
is affected by site constraints, work scheduling 
and housekeeping. The suitability, usability, 
condition and, therefore, safety of materials 
and equipment depend on their design, speci-
fication and supply/availability. 
These shaping factors are subject to origi-
nating influences, including the permanent 
works design, project management, construc-
tion processes, safety culture, risk manage-
ment, client requirements, economic climate 
and education provision. ConCA concluded 
that achieving a sustained improvement in 
safety in the industry would require concerted 
efforts by all stakeholders, directed at all levels 
in the influence hierarchy. 
Relating to other theories
Many research teams have sought to explain 
the causes of accidents. Early attempts were 
somewhat simplistic.4,5 More recent efforts 
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have acknowledged the complexity of real-life 
accidents, such as Petersen’s human error 
reduction approach,6 Hinze’s distractions 
theory,7 Loosemore’s chain of events model8 
and Suraji et al.’s constraint-response theory.9 
Abdelhamid and Everett’s model10 acknowl-
edges complexity but concentrates on site 
issues only.11
In his book Human Error,12 James Reason 
introduces a model to describe the causes of 
accidents. His work concentrates on major 
incidents such as Chernobyl, the Challenger 
space shuttle and London’s Kings Cross 
Underground fire and he argues that most 
safety systems have a number of layers, or 
plates. Each of these plates aims to prevent 
a potential incident passing through them. 
However, according to Reason, due to human 
error, none of the plates are impervious—they 
all have holes. These holes allow the potential 
incident to pass through the plate, or that layer 
of the safety system. In most cases, the next 
layer in the system will intercept the potential 
incident and prevent its occurrence. However, 
this next layer also has holes. Reason’s theory 
explains that when holes in all the plates line 
up, the potential incident becomes a real-
ity—the accident actually occurs. This theory 
neatly illustrates the role of chance in accident 
causality. Reason’s approach brings in the 
possibility of multi-causality, as a number of 
different holes could line up to allow the tra-
jectory of accident opportunity.
While Reason’s model was based on 
major incidents, the authors have applied the 
approach to the ConCA accident causality 
results. Thus the plates become the immediate 
circumstances, shaping factors and originating 
influences (Fig. 2). 
It can therefore be seen that failures by 
stakeholders responsible for action in each of 
these three areas can contribute to causing an 
accident. This approach has received support 
from a series of workshops involving more 
than 1000 industry practitioners and has been 
found to be a useful way of explaining the 
complex nature of accident causality and the 
interaction of roles of all the major stakehold-
ers. Efforts made to reduce holes in each of 
the plates will reduce the chance of accidents 
occurring, but will never prevent them com-
pletely. The ConCA work also identified a 
compelling reason why designers may feel 
frustrated by the lack of effect of their efforts 
to design-out hazards—in many cases, site 
health and safety practice was so poor that any 
efforts made by designers and project manage-
ment teams were being wasted at site level; 
in other words, using Reason’s model, the 
immediate accident circumstances plate was 
so full of holes that any hazards not removed 
pre-site were almost certainly going to result 
in accidents on site.
Adapting the original ConCA model slightly, 
the ConCA/Reason model can be used to 
simplify the message and challenge for the 
construction industry. The site team, who are 
largely responsible for the immediate circum-
stances, need to concentrate on reducing their 
own holes (i.e. site environment, workplace, 
worker and tools and equipment issues). 
The project management team and detailed 
designers (the main influencers of the shaping 
factors) should ensure that they work at the 
preconstruction planning and design aspects 
to reduce risk and hence close holes in their 
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Fig. 1. Loughborough’s ConCA accident causality model
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plate. Finally, the client team, concept design-
ers and others who have influence over the 
industry as a whole can work to reduce risk 
both at a project and at an industry level. It is 
only through such a collaborative effort that 
the number of accidents can be reduced.
Accident studies
The ConCA model was developed follow-
ing detailed studies of 100 accidents, to col-
lect further evidence on the issues raised by 
earlier focus groups. Sampling was on a quota 
basis, ensuring a spread of accidents across 
construction build type and RIDDOR accident 
categories (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and 
Dangerous Occurrences – the UK HSE’s cat-
egories for reporting accidents and incidents). 
Criteria for inclusion in the study were that the 
accident was not subject to investigation by 
HSE, that the accident had occurred within the 
preceding two months, and that the accident 
victim and supervisor/manager were still on site 
and willing to participate in the research.
Site-based data collection entailed inter-
views with accident-involved personnel and 
their supervisor or manager, inspection of the 
accident site and review of relevant documen-
tation, such as accident notification forms, risk 
assessments and method statements. A report 
of the site-based findings was reviewed by an 
expert pairing of construction and ergonomics 
specialists from the research team which sug-
gested areas for further follow-up examination. 
Where possible, issues identified were pursued 
directly with the designers, manufacturers and 
suppliers relevant to the incident. In many 
of the studies, however, this proved impos-
sible due to difficulty identifying appropriate 
individuals to contact and then securing their 
cooperation. In these cases, the issues were 
instead discussed with other professionals, 
independent of the accident but qualified to 
comment.
Due to the need to avoid incidents subject 
to HSE investigation, most of the accidents 
studied were not reportable under RIDDOR. 
Following assessment of the possible outcomes 
of each accident, more than a third were judged 
to have had the potential to cause a fatality and 
more than two-thirds could have been ‘major’ 
as classified under RIDDOR. On this basis, it 
is argued that it is reasonable to generalise the 
findings concerning causation from this sample 
to more serious accidents. Summaries from 
accident studies are set out below.
Overturning of self-loading/unloading truck
A truck was delivering scaffold to a site. 
The driver was trying to manoeuvre the load 
towards the drop zone when the truck tipped 
over, though no damage was caused (Fig. 3). 
The stabiliser feet (outriggers) had been put 
Fig. 3. Self-loading/unloading truck incident
Fig. 4. Manual handling steelwork incident
Table 1. Analysis of self-loading/unloading truck incident
Immediate accident 
circumstances
Shaping factors Originating influences
Worker Actions Fatigue Culture
Knowledge/skills Management/processes/culture
Client requirements
Economic climate
Communication Risk management (no risk assessment)
Site Congested work area Site constraints Permanent works design/client 
requirements
Overlapping trades Scheduling Project management/processes
Equipment Useability Design (controls)
Design (outriggers)
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down to the ground, but had not been extend-
ed beyond either side of the truck beforehand. 
An analysis of the circumstances, factors and 
influences is shown in Table 1.
Manual handling steelwork
Two men of significantly differing heights 
were moving steel angles by hand. One injured 
his hand while ‘dropping’ the angle to the 
floor (Fig. 4). An analysis of the circumstanc-
es, factors and influences is shown in Table 2.
Concrete pump accident
Concrete-pump pipes were being ‘blown 
through’, a cleaning process in which a wet 
foam ball is placed inside the pipe and is pro-
pelled to the other end with pressurised air, at 
the end of the workday. The accident report 
states that an operative was standing over the 
pipe (Fig. 5) and that with the force of propul-
sion as the last of the concrete and the wet 
ball came through, this threw him backwards 
onto a column. He sustained a groin and back 
injury and was off work for a week. An analy-
sis of the circumstances, factors and influences 
is shown in Table 3.
ConCA results and implications for 
industry
The results of the research of the ConCA 
project and the implications for industry are 
summarised as follows.
■ Problems arising from workers or the 
work team, especially worker actions or 
behaviour and worker capabilities, were 
judged to have contributed to over two-
thirds (70%) of the accidents. This points 
to inadequate supervision, education and 
training.
■ Poor communication within work teams 
contributed to some accidents, due to the 
physical distance between work colleagues 
or high levels of background noise.
■ Many accidents occurred when those 
involved were not actually performing a 
construction task (e.g. moving around 
site).
■ Workplace factors, notably poor house-
keeping and site layout and space avail-
ability problems, were considered to have 
contributed in half (49%) of the accident 
studies. Standards of housekeeping and 
workplace layout are low in construction 
compared to other industrial sectors.
■ Despite poor weather often being cited as 
one of the reasons for construction’s poor 
safety record, ConCA found little evidence 
in support of this.
■ Shortcomings with equipment, including 
personal protective equipment (PPE), 
were identified in over half (56%) of the 
incidents. Poor equipment design and 
inappropriate use of equipment for the 
task were prominent aspects. Designers, 
suppliers and purchasers of equipment 
appear to give insufficient attention to the 
safety of users.
■ Deficiencies with the suitability and con-
dition of materials, including packaging, 
featured in more than a quarter (27%) 
of incidents. The operation of the supply/
purchase chain at present appears to act 
as a barrier to innovation as far as safety 
is concerned. 
■ Originating influences, especially inad-
equacies with risk management, were 
considered to have been present in almost 
all (94%) of the accidents. Frequently, 
no risk assessment had been undertaken 
covering the circumstances involved in 
the accident. Where a risk assessment had 
been carried out, it was often found to be 
superficial and unlikely to have prevented 
the accident. 
■ PPE appears to be relied upon habitu-
ally as a substitute for risk elimination or 
reduction at source.
■ It was judged that up to half of the accidents 
could have been mitigated through a design 
change and it was found that, despite the 
Construction (Design and Management) 
Regulations (CDM),13 many designers are 
still failing to address the safety implications 
of their designs and specifications.
Table 3. Analysis of concrete pump accident
Immediate accident 
circumstances
Shaping factors Originating influences
Worker Actions Supervision Management
Fatigue Culture
Capabilities Knowledge/skills Management/processes/culture
Client requirements
Economic climate
Communication Risk management (no risk assessment)
Site Congested work area Site constraints Permanent works design/client requirements
Housekeeping Project management/culture
Client requirements
Overlapping trades Scheduling Project management/processes
Equipment Useability Design
Table 2. Analysis of manual handling steelwork incident
Immediate accident 
circumstances
Shaping factors Originating influences
Worker Actions Knowledge/skills Culture
Capabilities Knowledge/skills Risk management/processes/culture
Site Congested work area Site constraints Permanent works design/client 
requirements
Scheduling Project management/processes
Materials Useability Design for handling Permanent works design
Equipment Suitability Availability
Fig. 5. Concrete pump accident
Where a risk 
assessment had 
been carried 
out, it was often 
found to be 
superficial and 
unlikely to have 
prevented the 
accident
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■ Accident investigation by employers or 
supervising contractors was frequently 
superficial and of little value to improv-
ing safety. HSE investigations seem to 
focus on safety failures in the activity 
being undertaken, without capturing the 
upstream influences upon these.
■ The influence from clients on safety 
appeared limited in the construction sec-
tors predominant in this research (civil 
engineering, major building, residential). 
This was, again, despite the responsibili-
ties on clients imposed by CDM.
■ Many of the incidents were caused by 
commonplace hazards and activities that 
will continue to occur on site whatever 
design changes might be made. The wide-
spread presence of the many generic safety 
risks accompanying construction needs to 
be tackled before the benefits of design 
improvements will be realised.
Together, these factors point to failings in 
education, training and safety culture in the 
industry. A large majority of those working in 
construction, both on and off site, continue to 
have only a superficial appreciation of health 
and safety considerations.
Conclusions and recommendations
Drawing together the findings from the 
research, an accident model has been pro-
posed (Figs 1 and 2), illustrating the hierarchy 
of influences in construction accidents. The 
model describes how accidents arise from a 
failure in the interaction between the work 
team, workplace, equipment and materials. 
These immediate accident circumstances 
are affected by shaping factors, whereby the 
actions, behaviour, capabilities and com-
munication of the work team are affected by 
their attitudes, motivations, knowledge, skills, 
supervision, health and fatigue. 
The workplace is affected by site con-
straints, work scheduling and housekeep-
ing. The suitability, usability, condition and, 
therefore, safety of materials and equipment 
depend on their design, specification and 
supply/availability. These shaping factors are 
subject to originating influences, including the 
permanent works design, project management, 
construction processes, safety culture, risk 
management, client requirements, economic 
climate and education provision. 
Achieving a significant and sustained reduc-
tion in accidents will require concerted efforts 
directed at all levels of the hierarchy of causa-
tion. Important points are as follows.
■ Responsibility for safety needs to be 
owned and integrated across the project 
team, from designers and engineers 
through to skilled trade personnel and 
operatives. 
■ Other research has shown how the lead 
given by front-line supervisors has a 
strong influence on safety performance. 
Worker participation in managing safety is 
important, to generate ideas and to build 
ownership and responsibility.
■ Where safety depends on communication 
and coordination, it is important that a 
robust safe system of work is established.
■ A step change is required with standards 
of site layout and housekeeping. Principal 
contractors should raise expectations of 
what constitutes acceptable practice.
■ Greater attention should be given to the 
design and selection of tools, equipment 
and materials. Safety, rather than price, 
should be the paramount consideration.
■ There needs to be greater sophistication 
with the design and use of PPE. Current 
PPE is often uncomfortable and impedes 
performance. Forcing workers to wear 
PPE when risks are not present may even 
be counterproductive. PPE should be a 
last, rather than first, resort for risk man-
agement.
■ There is a need across the industry for 
proper engagement with risk assessment 
and risk management. Emphasis should be 
on actively assessing and controlling risk, 
rather than treating risk assessment as 
merely a paper exercise.
■ Construction should be encouraged to 
benchmark its safety practices against 
other industries. The excuse that construc-
tion is ‘different’ does not stand up to 
scrutiny.
■ Greater opportunity should be taken to 
learn from failures, with implementation 
of accident investigation procedures, both 
by employers and HSE, structured to 
reveal contributing factors earlier in the 
causal chain.
■ It is important that ‘safety’ is disassociated 
from ‘bureaucracy’.
■ Frequently, safety does not have to come 
at a price. Where there are cost implica-
tions, however, regulatory bodies and 
trade associations should work to make 
sure there is a level playing field.
Most of the changes depend on achieving 
widespread improvement in understanding of 
health and safety. Education is needed over 
training, so as to promote intelligent knowl-
edge rather than unthinking rule-based atten-
tion to safety.
Returning to the ConCA/Reason model 
(Fig. 2), each set of stakeholders must work 
hard to reduce the flaws in their ‘systems’ to 
reduce the likelihood of an upward trajectory 
of accident opportunity occurring.
What do you think?
If you would like to comment on this paper, 
please email up to 200 words to the editor at 
editor@ice.org.uk. 
If you would like to write a paper of 2000 to 3500 
words about your own experience in this or any 
related area of civil engineering, the editor will be 
happy to provide any help or advice you need.
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